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SURROGACY v. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
CYRIL C. MEANS, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The child, and the adolescent and adult that the child will
become, is the paramount party in interest in any case determin-
ing the legal parents of a child borne by a surrogate.1 This arti-
cle presents arguments on behalf of the child and adolescent-
adult-to-be that the surrogacy contract' is invalid under the
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. Harvard University 1938; J.D.
Wayne State University 1941; LL.M. Harvard University 1948.
1. In this article, the misleading expressions "surrogate parent" and "surrogate
mother" will not be used. The word "surrogate" means substitute. The natural mother is
not the "surrogate mother," but the actual mother of the child; the child's surrogate
mother is the adopter, the natural father's wife. The natural mother is actually a surro-
gate wife who substitutes for the natural father's wife in conceiving, gestating and bear-
ing his child.
The expression "surrogate mother" was coined by Noel P. Keane and other advo-
cates of commercialized surrogacy in an effort to steal a march on the debate by pre-
empting its vocabulary. Such an expression implies that the adopter is the real mother of
the surrogacy-produced child. In this article, therefore, the natural mother will be re-
ferred to either as surrogate or as mother.
In England, which has had nine years of judicial and legislative experience in dealing
with surrogacy-a longer period than in any other common law country or state in the
world-this semantic solecism has often been commented upon. A particularly lucid ex-
position was given by the Earl of Cork and Orrery in a House of Lords debate on a bill to
amend the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985:
So the woman who has the baby is the surrogate mother. She is the substi-
tute. But for what? For the real mother? No, she is the real mother. So, for what
is she a surrogate? She is the surrogate, according to the logic (if that is not too
strong a word to use in relation to what lies behind this Bill or Act) for some-
body who cannot have a baby. But that does not make her a surrogate mother, it
makes her a mother. The woman who gets the baby is the substitute for that
original mother who hands the baby over by a process of adoption.
This is the perfectly ordinary, simple, straightforward situation that actu-
ally occurs. . .put. . .into ordinary common English.
173 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 174 (1986).
2. The draftsmen of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 used the word "arrange-
ments" rather than "contracts." The term "contract" properly designates only an agree-
ment that courts will enforce. Since 1978 English courts have held a surrogacy agreement
"as being against public policy" so that no party "can rely upon it in any way or enforce
the agreement in any way," holding that "this was a purported contract for the sale and
purchase of a child." A. v. C., [1985] F.L.R. 445, 449 (Fain. & C.A. 1978).
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thirteenth amendment 3 and the federal Anti-Peonage Act," and
that fourteenth amendment 5 substantive due process does not
preserve the contract. The only existing population group analo-
gous to the current cohort of surrogacy-produced children is that
of full blood-stranger adoptees; a proper comparison between
these two groups is presented to define the differences between
these child-acquisition procedures and their impact on society.
The highly publicized Baby "M"6 case illustrates the nature
of the contractual relationships in a surrogacy arrangement and
is referred to extensively throughout this article. After reviewing
American legal precedent, this article turns to English law which
began addressing these issues almost a decade ago. Thus we may
learn from the English experience. This article urges serious
consideration of the English solutions to this problem.
A surrogacy contract has an inherently dual nature: from
impregnation through birth, it is a contract for personal services;
after birth, if the child is born alive, it is a contract of sale.
The typical surrogacy contract provides that upon surrender
of the born child to the natural father, a certain sum will be paid
to the natural mother. If the child should die, a much smaller
sum will be due to the natural mother. These provisions reveal
the nature of the agreement: a sale of services through birth;
Under our American Federal system, the situation is more complicated: the Thir-
teenth Amendment and the Anti-Peonage Act make impossible specific performance of
surrogacy agreements throughout the Union as a matter of federal law. The Congress
that enacted the Anti-Peonage Act excised from the bill a section that would have totally
invalidated agreements coming within its scope and would have made them unenforce-
able even by actions for damages. Such contracts therefore continue to be governed by
state law in regard to remedies other than decrees of affirmative specific performance.
Because of this Federalism-caused complexity, this article will use the expression "surro-
gacy contracts" while advocating adoption of English precedent to declare their total
invalidity under both federal and state law.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
4. Anti-Peonage Act, March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546, [now 42 U.S.C. § 1994
(1982) and 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982)1.
5. U.S. CONST amend. XIV.
6. In re Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), cert. granted,
107 N.J.140, 526 A.2d 203 (Apr. 7, 1987).
7. For example in the Baby "M" case, paragraph 4(A) of the Surrogate Parenting
Agreement (P-4) provided that "$10,000.00 shall be paid to Mary Beth Whitehead, Sur-
rogate, upon surrender of custody to William Stern," but paragraph 10 provided that in
"the event the child is miscarried, dies or is stillborn subsequent to the fourth (4th)
month of pregnancy and said child does not survive, the Surrogate shall receive $1,000.00
in lieu of the compensation enumerated in paragraph 4(A)."
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and, after birth, a sale of a living child.
It is this ambiguous nature of the contract that makes anal-
ysis of the conflict so complex. Those who favor validating surro-
gacy contracts argue that they are service agreements only. This
article posits that whether the agreement is one for services
only, or one for services plus the sale of a child, federal law pro-
hibits the bondage it would impose on both the mother and the
child.
CONTRACT FOR THE SALE AND PURCHASE OF A CHILD
Before 1865 and the passage of the thirteenth amendment,8
human beings held in slavery were always transferable, whether
by sale, gift inter vivos, or bequest in a will in the same manner
as chattels. Could a father then purchase his own child?
A common case was that of a free father siring a child by a
slave mother whom he owned. The free father already owned his
child because of his ownership of the mother; under the rule
partus sequitur ventrem the slave or free status of the offspring
was determined by that of the mother.
Another less frequent situation was where a free father sired
a child by a slave woman whom he did not own but whom he
had rented from her owner. Less affluent husbands often did not
have enough money to buy their wives a maid, but did have
enough to rent one. Where the husband impregnated a rented
slave, and she bore him a child, the offspring would belong to
the mother's owner. If the father wanted his child, he would
have to buy the child from the mother's owner. In Moss v.
Sandefur,9 a father tried to purchase and manumit10 his daugh-
ter from the owner of a rented slave. Unfortunately, he died
before completing the transaction and his child remained a
slave.
These antebellum cases where the free father was white
were not surrogacy cases. The free father's wife was also white
8. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1.
9. 14 Ark. 381 (1854).
10. Manumission is the act of liberating a slave from bondage and giving him his
freedom. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (5th ed. 1979). For an illustration of manumis-
sion, see infra note 14.
1987]
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and, even if infertile, would not have welcomed into her nuclear
family a child sired by her husband in a slave surrogate.
In the case of nonwhite free fathers," the institution of
slavery easily lent itself to a surrogacy scenario. One out of nine
Negroes in the United States in 1860 was free because of indi-
vidual manumission of himself or of a female ancestor. 2 After
manumission, free Negroes were permitted to continue to live in
some southern states; others required them to leave within a
stated period.' 3 Free Negroes often earned and saved enough
money to buy and manumit their own wives and children. 4
Let us consider a hypothetical case where the wife of a free
Negro had proved barren after being purchased and manumitted
by her husband who wanted sons. Like the Biblical Sarah, 5 she
could have suggested that he purchase or rent a maid from their
former owner and sire sons by the maid. Assume her husband
rented a maid in 1855, impregnated her, and, after she bore him
a son, he returned her to her owner, but bought his son,
manumitting him and giving him to his wife to rear as a foster
child. (There were no adoption statutes then and adoption did
11. Numerous references will be made to Americans of African descent before 1865,
both free and slave. Today, the majority of their descendants prefer to be called "black"
rather than "Negro," although a few, like Mr. Justice Marshall, still prefer "Negro." In
this article, references will be to what those persons called themselves in the age in which
they lived, e.g., "free Negroes." This departure from contemporary linguistic usage is
justified, it is believed, by fidelity to the history of the period discussed. For an informa-
tive treatment of the difference between notions of racial differentiation and nomencla-
ture that prevailed in the era of Reconstruction and those that are current today, see St.
Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987).
12. I. BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 137, Table 8 (1974) (based on Population of
the United States in 1860, at 598-604 (Washington, D.C. 1864)). In 1860, the proportion
of Negroes free was 11.0%.
13. For a descriptive note on manumission statutes of southern states in the antebel-
lum period, and a list of such statutes, see I. BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 138-39
(1974).
14. A recent book by Professors Michael P. Johnson and James L. Roark, BLACK
MASTERS: A FREE FAMILY OF COLOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1984), recounts in meticulous
detail the story of William Ellison (1790-1861) who became one of the richest men in
rural South Carolina. Born in slavery, the son of his white owner and namesake, he was
apprenticed to the local ginwright who taught him the art of manufacturing and repair-
ing cotton gins. In 1810, at age 20, Ellison married Matilda, then 16, another slave owned
by his master. In 1811, she bore him a daughter, Eliza Ann. In 1816, Ellison's owner-
father manumitted him. The following year, Ellison had earned enough money to buy
and manumit both Matilda and Eliza Ann. His subsequent sons by Matilda were born
free.
15. Genesis xvi. 1-16.
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not exist at common law.) In 1865, when the thirteenth amend-
ment was proclaimed, that son would have been ten years old.
The amendment would have freed his mother (the rented and
returned surrogate). If the mother then demanded that the wife
turn over to her her son, can there be any doubt about how a
court would have decided such a dispute?
The rental of women for surrogacy purposes was legally pos-
sible in the Old South, and it probably did occur where free Ne-
gro husbands had infertile wives. A free father who purchased
his own child from the rented mother's owner did in fact
"purchase what was already his." If a free father sired a child by
a surrogate who was free, she could not have been forced to sur-
render the child to the father. At common law, the mother's
right of custody of an illegitimate child was paramount to that
of every other person, including the father.16 Thus, a surrogacy
arrangement could not be enforced by any method when the
mother was free.
Today's fathers who enter surrogacy contracts are thus not
the first free men to rent a surrogate; they had exemplars
aplenty before 1865. For example, in the Baby "M"'7 case, Wil-
liam Stern did not merely rent a uterus, as one expert witness
has crudely put it. Anyone who has lived with a pregnant woman
knows that not only her reproductive tract but the entire woman
is involved in the pregnancy. Stern rented an entire woman.
There is an analytical distinction, however, between what a
modern father purchases and what a free Negro father pur-
chased when renting a surrogate. The modern father purchases
only the mother's half of the parental rights for the purpose of
transferring those to the adopting wife, whereas the free Negro
father purchased 100% of the parental rights to his child from
the owner.1" This distinction is accurate, but is constitutionally
16. See Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109 (1806).
17. In re Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), cert.
granted, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (Apr. 7, 1987).
18. The question arises: Is there a distinction between purchasing the person of the
child and purchasing parental rights to the child?
Before 1865, a free Negro had no rights as a father to his slave-born child unless he
purchased the child from its owner. If he then manumitted the child, he no longer owned
the child but he could still maintain parental rights. A modern father (in a state that has
enacted the Uniform Parentage Act) has, by virtue of his paternity, his own parental
rights to the child. What he does not have is the mother's parental rights. Sale of her
19871
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irrelevant; the thirteenth amendment19 unequivocally prohibits
the sale and purchase of human beings. This prohibition surely
applies to half of a child just as it does to a whole child.
Another distinction is that the free Negro father bought his
child not from the slave mother who did not own even herself
but from the owner; the modern father purchases his child from
the mother, a free woman. This distinction makes modern surro-
gacy worse in this respect than pre-1865 slavery. In the two and
one-half centuries (1619-1865) of African chattel slavery in this
country, countless babies were sold for money, sometimes sepa-
rately from their mothers, but never once did the mother sell her
own child. The spectacle of mothers openly and willingly selling
their own children, on a commercial basis, would not be encoun-
tered until the mid-1970s.
The thirteenth amendment invalidates the surrogacy ar-
rangement-a bargain for the sale of a child. If the agreement is
invalid, then the contractual remedy of specific performance is
unavailable.
The thirteenth amendment was the supreme constitutional
achievement of the United States in the nineteenth century. It
would be unthinkable if the present generation of Americans
were to discard that heritage.
CONTRACT FOR PERSONAL SERVICES
Characterization of the surrogacy agreement as a contract
for personal services does not remove it from invalidation by the
thirteenth amendment which also nullifies contracts for labor to
settle a debt or other obligation.
The framers of the thirteenth amendment borrowed its text
directly from Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance of 17870 in
which the Continental Congress within that Territory prohibited
both "slavery" and "involuntary servitude", which referred to
indentured bondage. Shipmasters regularly contracted with
parental rights is the equivalent of sale of the child. In the modern surrogacy context,
the contract strips the mother of her parental rights -to the child by awarding them to a
stranger, the father's wife. It is this total destruction of the mother's parental relation-
ship to the child which is so repugnant. Neither the child nor parenthood should be
bargainable.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. For full text, see supra note 8.
20. Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1787).
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would-be migrants to the American colonies and states to bring
them hither in return for an indenture obliging them to serve for
a term of years. On arrival here, the shipmaster would sell these
servants, together with their indentures, to Americans who
needed servants.2'
Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787 pro-
vided: "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed .. "22 This prohibition was repeated in the constitution
adopted by each of the states formed from the old Northwest
Territory, upon its admission to the Union.23 The southernmost
tier of these states-Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois-was bordered
by the Ohio River across which lay Kentucky and the other
slaveholding states. Some southern slaveholders wished to move
to the Territory with their slaves, but Article VI stood in the
way. One ploy used by such would-be migrants was to execute
deeds of manumission to the slaves while simultaneously taking
back from them indentures for long periods of years. Then,
when the Southerner migrated to the Territory, he could claim
that he was bringing with him not slaves, but only indentured
servants. Even so, the "involuntary servitude" prohibition in Ar-
ticle VI still presented an obstacle.
The constitution of Ohio, the first of the three states to
enter the Union, dealt with this problem comprehensively:
nor shall any male person, arrived at the age of twenty-
one years, nor female person, arrived at the age of eigh-
teen years, be held to serve any person as a servant,
under the pretense of indenture or otherwise, unless such
person shall enter into such indenture while in a state of
perfect freedom, and on condition of a bona fide consid-
eration, received, or to be received, for their service. ...
Nor shall any indenture of any negro or mulatto, hereaf-
ter made and executed out of this State, or, if made in
21. The apportionment clause of the Constitution refers to such persons as "free Per-
sons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
22. 1 Stat. 50, at 53.
23. OHIo CONST. 1802, art. VIII, § 2; IND. CONST. 1816, art. IX, § 7; ILL. CONST. 1818,
art. VI, § 1; MICH. CONST. 1835, art. XI; Wis. Const. 1848, art. I, § 2; MINN. CONST. 1857,
art. I, § 2.
1987]
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the State, where the term of service exceeds one year, be
of the least validity, except those given in the case of
apprenticeships.24
After Ohio's admission, the legislature of the territory, in
1803, adopted a Virginia law whose purpose, to nullify the "in-
voluntary servitude" clause in Article VI of the Northwest Ordi-
nance, is apparent in its very first section: "All negroes and mu-
lattoes (and other persons not being citizens of the United
States of America) who shall come into this territory under con-
tract to serve another in any trade or occupation, shall be com-
pelled to perform such contract specifically during the term
thereof."25 This statute made specifically enforceable within the
Indiana Territory indentures executed elsewhere. The next ef-
fort of the territorial legislature, passed in 1805 and reenacted in
the revision of 1807, created a procedure for executing such in-
dentures within the territory. Its first three sections provided:
§ 1 .... it shall and may be lawful for any person being
the owner or possessor of any negroes or mulattoes ...
owing service and labor as slaves in either of the states or
territories of the United States . . .to bring the said ne-
groes or mulattoes into this territory. § 2. That the owner
or possessor .. .shall within thirty days after such re-
moval, go with the same [negroes or mulattoes] before
the clerk of the court of common pleas of the proper
county, and in the presence of the said clerk the said
owner or possessor shall determine and agree with his or
her negro or mulatto upon the term of years which the
said negro or mulatto will and shall serve his or her said
owner or possessor, and the said clerk is hereby
24. OHIO CONST. 1802, art. VIII, § 2.
25. This clause was adopted by the Legislature of the new Indiana Territory which
was carved out of the Northwest Territory in 1809. This law may be found in the codi-
fied territorial laws. IND. TERRITORY L. 1803, ch. 2, in LAws OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY,
1801-1806, at 26-31 (1886), also in F. PHILBERICK, THE LAWS OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY
1801-1809, at 42-46 (1930).
Professor Philbrick's Special Introduction to this volume runs to more than 200
pages, and contains a meticulously researched account of the controversies over slavery
and indenture in the Territory. Between 1803 (after the admission of Ohio to the Union)
and 1809, the expression "Indiana Territory" included what is now both Indiana and
Illinois. In 1809, Indiana and Illinois were divided into separate territories.
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authorised and required to make a record thereof, in a
book which he shall keep for the purpose. § 3. That if
any negro or mulatto removed into this territory as afore-
said, shall refuse to serve his or her owner as aforesaid, it
shall and may be lawful for such person within sixty days
thereafter, to remove the said negro or mulatto to any
place, which by the laws of the United States, or territory
from whence such owner or possessor may or shall be
authorised to remove the same [sic].2"
While the 1805-07 legislation, unlike that of 1803, does not ex-
pressly use terms denoting specific enforcement, Section 3, hold-
ing over a repudiating servant's head the threat of being sent
back to a slave state, was designed to intimidate him into con-
tinuing his service.
This 1805-07 law was called the Registered Servants Law. 7
It was even more blatantly in violation of Article VI than the
1803 act, which at least had the excuse of merely enforcing a
contract made elsewhere. There was considerable antislavery
sentiment against the Registered Servants Law, which, in Indi-
ana, eventually (in 1810) sufficed to assure its repeal.
These laws were in effect in 1809 when the Territories of
Indiana and Illinois were separated from the Northwest Terri-
tory and each allowed its own territorial legislature. In 1810, the
Indiana legislature repealed both the 1803 and the 1805-07 legis-
26. IND. TERR. L. 1805, ch. 26, in LAWS OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY, 1801-1806, at 69-73
(1886), also in F. PHILBRICK, THE LAWS OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1809, at 136-39
(1930). This 1805 act was reenacted, with only minor and inconsequential changes in
language, in IND. TERR. L. 1807, ch. 64, in LAWS OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1806, at
423-28 (1886), also in F. PHILBRICK, THE LAWS OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1809, at
523-26 (1930).
The draftsmanship of Section 3 is incoherent. There should be the word "to" be-
tween "any place," and "which." And the words "from whence" should not be in the
Section at all. With these emendations, the text expresses the meaning attributed to it
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Phoebe, a Woman of Color v. Jay, 1 111. 268, 270
(1828):
Nothing can be conceived farther from the truth, than the idea that there could
be a voluntary contract between the negro and his master. The [1805-1807] law
authorizes the master to bring his slave here, and take him before the clerk, and
if the Negro will not agree to the terms proposed by the master, he is authorized




lation;28 so no further indenturings and registrations could le-
gally occur in Indiana. Illinois did not repeal this legislation dur-
ing the remainder of its territorial period; indeed, in 1812 it
continued the 1807 law.29
On its admission to the Union, Indiana's constitution
provided:
Art. IX, § 7. There shall be neither slavery nor invol-
untary servitude in this State, otherwise than for the
punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted. Nor shall any indenture of any negro or
mulatto, hereafter made and executed out of the bounds
of this State, be of any validity within the State."0
Early in its statehood, Indiana was confronted with opposi-
tion to this clause. In 1820, a woman of color named Polly sued
for habeas corpus. 1 Her master argued that he held her as his
slave since she was the offspring of a slave purchased from the
Indians. The argument was made on his behalf that because the
language of Art. IX, § 7 was prospective ("[t]here shall be" (em-
phasis added)), he could not be divested of his right to her ser-
vices which long antedated the constitution of 1816. The Su-
preme Court of Indiana held otherwise, and discharged Polly
from service. 2
In 1821, the same court heard another habeas corpus case
brought by one Mary Clark, a woman of color.3 3 Defendant
Johnson returned that she was his servant by an indenture exe-
cuted in Indiana on October 24, 1816 (almost four months after
the new constitution had been established on June 29, 1816). By
that indenture, he argued, "the said Mary (being a free woman)
voluntarily bound herself to serve him as an indentured servant
and house maid for 20 years." '34 The court held that by bringing
28. IND. TERR. L. 1810, ch. 28.
29. LAWS PASSED BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
ILLINOIS TERRITORY. ._. IN 1812, at 5. (ed. M. Duncan 1813, reprinted 1920) (Act of Dec.
13, 1812).
30. IND. CONST. 1816, art. XI, § 7.
31. State v. Lasselle, 1 Blackf. 60 (1820).
32. Id.
33. The case of Mary Clark, a Woman of Color, 1 Blackf. 122, 12 Am. Dec. 213 (Ind.
1821).
34. Id. at 123, 12 Am. Dec. at 213.
[Vol. IV
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
the habeas corpus suit she had "clearly evince[d] that the ser-
vice she renders to the obligee is involuntary" 35 and thus in vio-
lation of the prohibition of involuntary servitude in Art. IX, § 7.
"It is a covenant for personal service, and the obligee requires a
specific performance. It may be laid down as a general rule, that
neither the common law nor the statutes in force in this State
recognize the coercion of a specific performance of [such] con-
tracts."3 6 After distinguishing the cases of apprentices, soldiers,
and sailors, the court observed that "[there are some contracts
that may be specially enforced in equity; but they are of a very
different nature from the contract before us. They . . . in no
case have any relation to the person."37 To Johnson's argument
that the court should not interfere and prevent him from retain-
ing Mary in his service by self-help, the court "unhesitatingly
conclude[d], that when the law will not directly coerce specific
performance, it will not leave a party to exercise the law of the
strong, and coerce it in his own behalf. A state of servitude thus
produced, either by direct or permissive coercion, would not be
considered voluntary either in fact or in law. . . . The fact then
is, that the appellant [Mary Clark] is in a state of involuntary
servitude; and we are bound by the constitution, the supreme
law of the land, to discharge her therefrom." 8
The Case of Mary Clark is a leading authority for the true
construction of the words "involuntary servitude" in a constitu-
tional prohibition; it establishes the following points, both of
which are applicable to the thirteenth amendment: (1) the fact
that the servitude originated in a voluntary contract does not
mean that it is still voluntary if the servant changes his mind;
(2) this constitutional prohibition, unlike most others, runs not
only against the government, but also against private persons:
hence it outlaws self-help.
Clark's Case is important for another reason. It was pub-
lished in the first edition of the earliest volume of Blackford's
Reports in 1830, just two years before Henry Smith Lane began
the study of law in Indiana. Later on, in 1867, Lane was to give
an explanation of the meaning of the 1867 anti-peonage bill in
35. Id.
36. Id., 12 Am. Dec. at 214.




the United States Senate which follows the reasoning of the In-
diana Supreme Court in Clark's Case.39
Parallel constitutional activity was occurring in Illinois.
Upon admission to the Union, Illinois's constitution contained a
provision closely following Ohio's but with the addition of a sav-
ing clause looking in the opposite direction:
Art. VI, § 3. Each and every person who has been
bound to service by contract or indenture in virtue of the
laws of Illinois Territory heretofore existing, and in con-
formity to the provisions of the same, without fraud or
collusion, shall be held to a specific performance of their
contracts or indentures; and such negroes and mulattoes
as have been registered in conformity with the aforesaid
laws shall serve out the time appointed by said
laws .... 0
The "laws of Illinois Territory heretofore [i.e., before 1818, when
the constitution was adopted] existing" were, of course, the Reg-
istered Servants Law (as finally codified by the Illinois Territo-
rial Legislature in 1812)."
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the Territorial Registered Servants Law had been void dur-
ing the territorial period because it had been violative of Article
VI of the Northwest Ordinance, but that it was validated by this
saving clause in the new Illinois constitution. Consequently, the
court specifically enforced the indentures that had been regis-
tered under those laws. The court made it plain that, but for the
saving clause, the prohibition of "involuntary servitude" in Arti-
cle VI, § 1 of the Illinois constitution would have invalidated
those registered indentures, just as, in the territorial period, Ar-
ticle VI of the Ordinance had done (de jure if not de facto). 2
39. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (Feb. 19, 1867); see infra note 56.
40. ILL. CONST. 1818, art. VI, § 3. Section 1 of this article abolished slavery and invol-
untary servitude; section 3 (the saving clause) preserved involuntary servitude with re-
spect to persons indentured under the Territorial Registered Servants Law.
41. LAWS PASSED BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF IL-
LINOIS TERRITORY, ... IN 1812, at 5. (ed. M. Duncan 1813, reprinted 1920) (Act of Dec.
13, 1812).
42. Nance, a Girl of Color v. Howard, 1 Il. 242 (1828); Phoebe, a Woman of Color v.
Jay, 1 111. 268 (1828); Boon v. Juliet, a Woman of Color, 2 Ill. 258 (1836); Choisser v.
Hargrave, a Colored Man, 2 Ill. 317 (1836); Sarah, a Woman of Color v. Borders, 5 Ill.
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Thus, though different results obtained in Indiana and in
Illinois, owing to the absence of the saving clause from the for-
mer's constitution and its presence in the latter's, the two state
Supreme Courts were of one mind as to what a constitutional
prohibition of "involuntary servitude," would accomplish: both
agreed that it would bar specific performance of a contract of
personal service.
There were no provisions concerning indentures in the con-
stitutions of the remaining states admitted to the Union from
the old Northwest Territory, nor did their courts render judicial
decisions on the subject.
By 1864-65, when Congress was debating the proposal to the
states of the thirteenth amendment, indentured servitude had
waned as a significant phenomenon, but a similar situation had
entered the Union in 1846 when we acquired from Mexico the
Territory of New Mexico. This was peonage, a system of servi-
tude by contract between master and peon which obliged the
peon to work off a debt or other obligation owed to the master at
an agreed rate. Like indentured servitude, peonage was specifi-
cally enforceable by statute.
The framers of the thirteenth amendment and of the fed-
eral Anti-Peonage Act43 were familiar with the leading New
Mexico case of Jaremillo v. Romero4 wherein the court traced
the history of the peonage system through its successive incarna-
tions in Spanish, Mexican, and territorial law.45 It was this sys-
341 (1843). Cf. Jarrot, a Colored Man v. Jarrot, 7 Ill. 1 (1845), in which the saving clause
did not apply. Plaintiff had never been indentured or registered under the Territorial
statutes preserved by the saving clause. He was a slave held by a French settler, and not
being within the saving clause, was liberated by ILL. CONST. 1818, art. VI, § 1. Accord,
State v. Lasselle, 1 Blackf. 60 (Ind. 1820), which held Polly, a slave also of a French
settler, liberated by IND. CONST. art. XI, § 7, which had no saving clause.
43. 14 Stat. 546 [now 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1982) and 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982)].
44. 1 N.M. (Gild.) 190 (1857),
45. The Court in Jaremillo v. Romero was addressing the issue under the most recent
Territorial legislation (the Act of 1852), when it said:
By this [Act of 1852] he [the peon] must abide by and fulfill his agreement
according to its terms, whether he owes or does not owe, pays or does not pay.
Unless he can get his master's consent to rescind or prove some one of the causes
specified to procure a cancellation, he may be prosecuted for a failure [to per-
form his contract], and so may the master, and the servant [may be] compelled
to a compliance by a fine and imprisonment. ...
It [peonage] is seen to be carefully regulated by the legislature; that the
relation of master and servant is formed by mutual consent only; that all free
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tern of peonage at which the words "involuntary servitude" in
the thirteenth amendment and the entire text of the 1867 Anti-
Peonage Act were principally aimed.46
The Jaremillo Court relied upon language from White's
Recopilacion: "The second onerous contract is that of renting,
by which one person lets or grants to another person the service
of his person or beast, or the use or enjoyments of a thing for a
certain time. '4 7 It would be hard to pen language more apt to
describe a surrogacy agreement, whereby a woman rents the re-
productive services of her body and the ability to nurture an un-
born child.
The New Mexican peonage system was capable of accommo-
dating surrogacy contracts by allowing a peon woman to bear
her master's child and surrender it to her master's infertile wife.
There is one case, Bustamento v. Analla,4 which may have
originated in a surrogacy arrangement. A peon woman, Juana
Analla, bore her master, Carpio Bustamento, two children, Cata-
lina and George, who were reared in the house of their father
from earliest infancy. Juana owed Carpio $147.00. Before an al-
calde in 1847, Carpio forgave Juana $47.00 of that indebtedness
in return for which Juana signed an adjustment of the account
stating that "from this date the mother gives them [the two chil-
men and women, when no legal impediment exists, may celebrate this species of
contracts; that the servant cannot leave his master's service during the time em-
braced in the contract, unless he proves some one of the two causes to exist,
mentioned in the statute, or shall obtain his master's consent, and shall pay
what he owes him; that if he shall refuse to serve in conformity with the con-
tract, he may be compelled to its fulfillment by the magistrate with the chastise-
ments of fine and imprisonment; that the master may procure summary pro-
ceedings before the judicial officer to enforce compliance; if the servant is a
parent, and dies, the children are not compelled to serve in his stead; that the
contract may be entered into before judges of probate or justices of the peace,
who shall authenticate or attest the same, as they also may account between the
parties. A peon or servant loses none of his rights as a citizen by contracting
with a master to serve him. He is under no political disqualifications; he votes at
all elections if otherwise legally qualified; his servitude does not render him
under our laws ineligible to the offices of the precinct, the county, the legislature,
or delegate in congress.
Such are some of the features which the peon system (as commonly called)
presents in this territory. . ..
Id. at 206-207.
46. Id., 1 N.M. (Gild.) 190 (1857).
47. Id. at 195-196.
48. 1 N.M. (Gild.) 255 (1857).
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dren] to Bustamento, that he may maintain and educate them
as a legitimate father who will be responsible before God and
man."49 Carpio's marital status is not stated. Thus the birth of
Juana's children may have been the result of a nonmarital or
extramarital liaison unconnected with any surrogacy
arrangement.
The present suit was brought by Juana against Marcellina
Bustamento, a female relative of Carpio, who had been given
Juana's daughter by Carpio. Juana sued in habeas corpus charg-
ing Marcellina with possession of her daughter under a claim of
peonage. The Territorial Supreme Court decided in Juana's
favor: she was the mother of an illegitimate child, and, as such,
at common law, had a right of custody superior to all other per-
sons, including the natural father.50
The case is valuable as an indication of what short shrift
nineteenth century courts were inclined to give to contracts be-
tween parents of illegitimate children whereby one surrendered
custody to the other.
In Jaremillo v. Romero,5 the facts appeared that a father
had contracted his minor daughter into peonage in order to pay
off the father's debt to the master. The court held that no father
could contract his child into peonage to pay off his own debts for
a period longer than the child's minority.
The New Mexican statutory system of specifically enforcea-
ble labor contracts stands in sharp contrast to the common law
rules. American courts have been historically reluctant to en-
force specifically contracts for personal service.2
49. Id.
50. The common law rule that a mother had a right to custody of her illegitimate
child superior to that of the father can be found in the leading case of Wright v. Wright,
2 Mass. 109 (1806).
51. 1 N.M.(Gild.) 190 (1857).
52. American courts have universally followed the leading English case of Lumley v.
Wagner, 64 Eng. Rep. 1209 (V. Ch. 1852), aff'd, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). A Prussian
soprano, Johanna Wagner, had contracted with a London theatre owner, Lumley, to sing
at his theatre on specified dates, and not to sing at any rival theatre in England without
Lumley's permission. Recreant to her contract with Lumley, Frfiulein Wagner suc-
cumbed to the blandishments of a rival London theatre owner named Gye, who offered
her more money to sing at his place. Needless to say, she did this without seeking
Lumley's leave. Lumley sued her for specific performance. It was held that he might
recover damages against her, and even have a negative injunction forbidding her to sing
for Gye, but not an affirmative decree of specific performance commanding her to sing
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Congressional debates leading to passage of the Anti-Peon-
age Act were heated.5 3 The sponsor of the bill (S. No. 543), Sen-
ator Wilson of Massachusetts, described peonage as "a condition
of modified servitude, which we have inherited from Mexico. It
exists in New Mexico at this time, the only part of the country
where I know it does exist. In some cases it is voluntary, but in
most cases forcible.
' '54
Senator Davis of Kentucky reacted to this description: "I
suppose that to the extent that it is voluntary there is no neces-
sity and no power on the part of Congress to interfere with it.
But how far and to what extent is it voluntary? The system of
apprenticeship is a servitude, and an involuntary servitude."55
Senator Lane of Indiana, a lawyer, attempted to elucidate:
"We simply say by this bill that peonage shall be abolished, and
the creditor shall be left to all his legal means of collecting his
debt, but he shall not hold the peon in slavery. I understand
that by this system the creditor not only had a right by an invol-
untary process to the labor of the peon, but the debtor if he
chose might become the servant of the creditor and serve until
the debt was paid."5 6
These debates in the Senate took place on February 19,
1867, on which day Senator Wilson moved to strike out the ear-
lier version of the bill, and substitute a new version.5 7 This sub-
stituted version is the one passed by both Houses.
Senator Lane's statement that the revised bill allowed the
creditor "all his legal means" (emphasis added) of enforcing his
contract but denied him any "right by an involuntary process to
the labor of the peon,"'58 reflects the holding of Lumley v. Wag-
ner,5" by not forbidding the master an action for damages at law
or even a negative injunction in equity,' but denying him any af-
firmative decree of specific performance.
The earlier version of S. No. 543 had gone much farther.
for Lumley.
53. The debates are reported in Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 239-41, 764, 789,
1571-72 (Senate, Jan.-Feb. 1867), and 1770 (House of Representatives, Mar. 1867).










That version, dated January 26, 1867, is not printed in the Con-
gressional Globe, but exists in both a manuscript and a printed
text in the National Archives.6
This earlier version (January 26, 1867) contained a Section
3, which read:
And be it further enacted, That all debts, obliga-
tions, loans, or advances, either in money or other prop-
erty, which have been made or incurred, and in liquida-
tion of which the voluntary or involuntary service or
labor of any person or persons who have heretofore been
held in a state of peonage in the Territory of New Mex-
ico, or in any other Territory or State of the United
States, is, or shall hereafter be, required, claimed, main-
tained, or attempted to be enforced, are hereby declared
null and void; and any person or persons whose service or
labor, as such peons, is so claimed or required, shall be
immediately discharged, by virtue of this act, from all
such debts, obligations, loans, or advances of money or
property, and shall never be held liable to any person for
the recovery of the same or for any other consequences
resulting from, or pertaining to, their former state of
peonage."
This section would have wholly invalidated the peon's con-
tract with the master and would have made it impossible for the
latter to recover damages in an action at law. It was eliminated
from the substituted bill which passed both Houses. By elimi-
nating Section 3, the sponsors of S. No. 543 tailored it to con-
form strictly to the Lumley v. Wagner model.2
If the earlier version had been passed, then American fed-
eral law would have been the same throughout the Union as it is
in England: surrogacy contracts could not be enforced "in any
way." By revising the bill's language, Congress allowed each
state to decide whether damage actions or negative injunctions
should be allowed in suits on contracts of personal service as a
matter of state public policy. The Anti-Peonage Act, as passed,
federally preempts only the affirmative specific performance
60. S. 543, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1867).
61. Id.
62. 64 Eng. Rep. 1209, aff'd, 42 Eng. Rep. 687.
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remedy."
The language of the bill as passed-"the voluntary or invol-
untary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of
any debt or obligation, or otherwise" 6 -is broad enough to
cover nonmonetary obligations as well as money debts and thus
is commensurate with the institution described by Chief Justice
Benedict in Jaremillo v. Romero 5 The statute makes all state
and territorial laws "by which any attempt shall hereafter be
made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly"
such service or labor "null and void." 6
Congress passed the Anti-Peonage Act pursuant to its
power to enforce the thirteenth amendment as granted by Sec-
tion 2 thereof.6 7 This act furthers the intent and purpose of the
thirteenth amendment to ensure freedom of all persons from
bondage. If the surrogacy agreement is a contract for personal
services whose obligation is discharged only by the surrender of
a child, it cannot be specifically enforced without violating the
Anti-Peonage Act. Federal law pre-empts states from passing
any law specifically enforcing such a contract. The peonage pro-
hibited is not just servitude of the mother, but also involuntary
servitude of the child whose transfer to the adoptive parent is
contracted for before birth. Therefore, however a surrogacy con-
tract is characterized, it is specifically unenforceable.
During the first half of this century, various southeastern
states enacted laws which the Supreme Court held null and void
as violative of both the thirteenth amendment and the Anti-Pe-
onage Act."5
In its lengthy decision of the highly publicized Baby "M" 9
case, the trial court devotes a single paragraph to the thirteenth
amendment, viz:
The third argument [against surrogacy] is that to pro-
63. Anti-Peonage Act, March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546.
64. Id.
65. 1 N.M. (Gild.) 190 (1857).
66. Anti-Peonage Act, March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546.
67. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
68. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133
(1914); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
69. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A. 2d 1128 (1987).
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duce or deal with a child for money denigrates human
dignity. To that premise, this court urgently agrees. The
13th Amendment to the United States Constitution is
still valid law. The law of adoption in New Jersey does
prohibit the exchange of any consideration for obtaining
a child. The fact is, however, that the money to be paid
to the surrogate is not being paid for the surrender of the
child to the father. And that is just the point-at birth,
mother and father have equal rights to the child absent
any other agreement. The biological father pays the sur-
rogate for her willingness to be impregnated and carry
his child to term. At birth, the father does not purchase
the child. It is his own biological genetically related child.
He cannot purchase what is already his.70
The trial judge believed that by characterizing the surro-
gacy contract as one for personal services, the thirteenth amend-
ment would not apply, and thus failed to apply the appropriate
law to such an agreement-the Anti-Peonage Act.
In his endeavor to exorcise the applicability of the thir-
teenth amendment from the case, the trial judge declared that
the father "cannot purchase what is already his" 7 -his own pa-
rental rights as a father to his child. New Jersey has adopted a
version of the Uniform Parentage Act 72 which advances the nat-
ural father's position from that of no rights at common law to a
position of substantial parental rights. What the father is
purchasing is not his half of the parental rights to the child but
the mother's half so that he can transfer those to his wife, the
would-be adopter of the child.
The agreement is thus a third-party beneficiary contract. In
the Baby "M'"7 case, the immediate parties are William Stern
and the Whiteheads; the donee beneficiary is Elizabeth Stern.
70. Id. at 372, 525 A.2d 1157. The trial judge twice characterized the contract as one
for personal services: 217 N.J. Super. at 374, 525 A.2d at 1158 ("personal service"); 217
N.J. Super. at 377, 525 A.2d at 1160 ("The bargain here was one for totally personal
service"). And he even asserts that the surrogate's "right to perform [such] services" is
"constitutionally protected", citing, as authority for this proposition, Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); 217 N.J. Super. at 387, 525 A.2d at 1165!
71. Id.
72. See e.g., N.J.S.A. 9:17-44(b), 9:14-45(d) and 9:17-53(c)(West Supp. 1986).
73. In re Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), cert.
granted, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (Apr. 7, 1987).
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As between William and Elizabeth Stern, the maternal right to
Baby M is a chattel given; as between Mary Beth Whitehead
and William Stern, the maternal right to Baby "M" is a chattel
sold.
The trial court's assertion that a father cannot purchase
what is already his rests upon the unspoken premise that, before
the passage of the thirteenth amendment in 1865, a father could
not purchase his own child or the parental rights to his child.
The fallacy of this premise has already been shown.
By focusing on the father and the service side of the bar-
gain, the trial court avoided addressing the mother and the sales
side of the contract. This tunnel vision enabled the court more
easily to dismiss the applicability of the thirteenth amendment.
Mary Beth Whitehead clearly made a prenatal contract for the
postnatal sale of her child. Whether the buyer was to be William
Stern or whether he was merely a conduit behind whom stands
the true buyer, Elizabeth Stern, is irrelevant; that Mary Beth
Whitehead was a seller is beyond cavil. Even if this sale is char-
icterized as one for service, it is invalid under the Anti-Peonage
Act; thus, the trial court made a grave error in its analysis of the
law.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRAST BETWEEN ADOPTION AND
SURROGACY
If surrogacy violates the thirteenth amendment as a con-
tract for the sale and purchase of a child, why does it not
equally forbid ordinary adoption between full blood-strangers?
The right to adopt exists only by virtue of statute; there is
no constitutional right to adopt. On the other hand, no court has
ever declared an adoption statute unconstitutional. Adoption is
a system that the legislature of a state may enact; it has-"su-
preme control over the subject." '74
In ordinary adoption, where the adopters and the adoptee
are entire blood-strangers, no money changes hands; this is ex-
pressly prohibited in all states by statutes against baby-selling.",
74. In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y. 2d 568, 570, 370 N.Y.S. 2d 511, 513, 331 N.E. 2d
486, 487-88 (1975), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question sub nom.
Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976).
75. See ALA.CODE § 26-10-8 (1986); ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(B), 8-126(4)(C)-(F)
(1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-211 (Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West Supp.
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The thirteenth amendment, however, is not limited to
prohibiting trafficking in human beings for money; it also for-
bids selling them for nonmonetary considerations or disposing of
them by noncontractual transactions such as inter vivos gifts or
bequests in wills.76 In ordinary adoption, nonmonetary consider-
ations are exchanged between the adult parties: the natural par-
ent or parents is or are relieved of the legal obligation to support
the child during minority;77 the adopters acquire a child with
attendant joys and responsibilities. Therefore, the ordinary
adoption contract is a prima facie violation of the thirteenth
amendment. Here, however, it is wise to recall one of the pithier
dicta of Mr. Justice Holmes: "Upon this point a page of history
is worth a volume of logic." 8
Although the thirteenth amendment contains only one ex-
press exception-"except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted" 7 9-the Supreme Court has
recognized other, tacit exceptions. For example, in Robertson v.
Baldwin,8" the Court held the shipping articles of a merchant
seaman specifically enforceable while noting that soldiers,
sailors, and apprentices could be compelled to perform the ser-
vice for which they had enlisted or been contracted without vio-
lating the thirteenth amendment.8
1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 § 15526, 1701, 1702 (1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210
§ 11A (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West 1986-87).
76. See supra note 8.
77. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. § 32 (McKinney's 1987).
78. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. For full text, see supra note 8.
80. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
81. The pertinent passage in the Court's decision in Robertson v. Baldwin explains
the Court's reasoning for allowing these exceptions:
But we are also of opinion that, even if the contract of a [merchant] seaman
could be considered within the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not,
within its spirit, a case of involuntary servitude. The law is perfectly well settled
that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill
of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government,
but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited
from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been subject
to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In
incorporating these principles into the fundamental law there was no intention
of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had
been formally expressed. [Here the Court adverted to certain tacit exceptions it
had recognized to the First, Second and Fifth Amendments.]
The prohibition of slavery, in the Thirteenth Amendment, is well known to
19871 465
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
Here the Court justified the tacit exceptions on two sepa-
rate grounds: (1) history, and (2) "the necessities of the case."82
Inasmuch as adoption did not exist at common law and, wher-
ever it does exist, does so solely by virtue of statute, there can be
no historical basis for an exception to the thirteenth amendment
in favor of adoption. The basis for the exception therefore must
be the necessities of the case.
The necessities of the case discussed in Robertson v. Bald-
win 88 are all necessities of society; and there is such a necessity
of society to which legislatures have responded by enacting
adoption statutes. In the case of ordinary adoption, a child has
been brought into existence by parents who cannot or will not
care for it. This gives rise to a necessity of the child to be taken
care of until it reaches the age of majority. Society responds to
the child's necessity in one of two ways: by institutionalizing it
or by providing it with an adoptive home. Most people think the
latter alternative better from the point of view of the child. Soci-
ety's necessity is to respond to the child's necessity for nurture.
It is this reciprocal necessity of the child and the state which
justifies the exception to the prohibition against trafficking in
human beings which the thirteenth amendment would impose.
Note that the needs of the adults who are parties to the transac-
tion are served, but they are not necessities. Standing alone, the
needs of the adults would never justify making a tacit exception
to the thirteenth amendment.
If we turn from ordinary adoption to surrogacy, the picture
changes radically in regard to necessity. Adoption is the societal
method of providing for the necessity of the child. From the
have been adopted with reference to a state of affairs which had existed in cer-
tain States of the Union since the foundation of the government, while the addi-
tion of the words "involuntary servitude" were [sic] said in the Slaughterhouse
Cases, 16 Wall. 36 [1876], to have been intended to cover the system of Mexican
peonage and the Chinese coolie trade, the practical operation of which might
have been a revival of the institution of slavery under a different and less offen-
sive name. It is clear, however, that the amendment was not intended to intro-
duce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service which
have always been treated as exceptional; such as military and naval enlistments,
or to disturb the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their minor
children or wards.





child's perspective there is no necessity whatsoever that he be
procreated and sold. He is not in existence when the surrogacy
agreement is signed. It is an agreement by adults, of adults, and
for adults, which they designed to satisfy their own needs and
(some would add) greeds. No necessity of any child prompts
such an agreement. So far is a surrogacy agreement from re-
sponding to the necessity of any child that one can say that it
creates ex nihilo a child for the very purpose of imposing on
that child a necessity as a fait accompli. Such an agreement can-
not come within any rationally imaginable tacit exception to the
thirteenth amendment.
There are those who argue that a surrogacy-produced and
sold child will be loved even more than an ordinary blood-stran-
ger adoptee: he will be the most wanted of children. History in-
structs us to distinguish between wantedness and love: In the
days of slavery, every slave was wanted. Once a slave's master no
longer wanted him, he was cast off by manumission or sale.
Ordinary adoption seeks to meet the needs of the child and
society. Surrogacy, by contrast, arises out of adult desires which
it addresses by a form of child-production and sale. These in
turn result in a complex of adult relationships and disputes
which society must then confront and resolve. In other words,
ordinary blood-stranger adoption is a necessary evil. Surrogacy
is an unnecessary evil.
THE RIGHT To "BEAR OR BEGET A CHILD"
The negative constitutional right to refrain from "bear[ing]
or beget[ting] a child" is well established. 4 States cannot pro-
hibit or curtail an individual's effort to refrain from reproduc-
tion; such governmental effort is unconstitutional under the sub-
stantive element of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment"8 as violative of the individual's right of privacy
which exists within the word "liberty" in the clause.
Only one Supreme Court decision asserts an affirmative
right of "procreation," Skinner v. Oklahoma," where an
84. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
86. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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Oklahoma law imposed involuntary vasectomies and salp-
ingectomies on certain categories of convicted felons. The
Court's decision rested on the equal protection clause, but a
strong dictum couched in substantive due process clause lan-
guage affirmed procreation as "one of the basic civil rights of
man."
87
The "bear or beget a child" language first appeared in Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird:88
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two indi-
viduals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
make-up. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child ... 89
Five years later, in Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,90 Mr. Justice Brennan emphasized that what the Consti-
tution protects is "individual decisions in matters of childbear-
ing from unjustified intrusion by the State."'"
Under this formulation, the commissioning "marital couple"
is not "an independent entity. . .but an association of two indi-
viduals" each of whom must "be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion. ' 92 To argue that by refusing specific perform-
ance of a surrogacy agreement a state would be committing an
unwarranted governmental intrusion into the decision-making of
either of them is absurd. The procreation occurs between the
surrogate and the father, not between the father and his wife.
Therefore, there is no state interference with the right to procre-
ate of either of the child's parents.
The adopting wife also has a fourteenth amendment sub-
stantive due process liberty to procreate and to bear a child.
Fourteenth amendment rights, of course, run only against the
87. Id. at 541.
88. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
89. Id. at 453.
90. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
91. Id. at 685.
92. See supra note 90.
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state, not against private persons. (Thirteenth amendment
rights run against both the state and private persons.) No state
has attempted to interfere with the adopting wife's right to pro-
create or to bear a child. If she was fertile, she has chosen not to
exercise it. If she was infertile, then Nature prevented her from
exercising that right, but the vicissitudes of nature are not state
action.
The best precedent on this question yet rendered by an
American court is found in Doe v. Kelly: 3
While the decision to bear or beget a child has thus been
found to be a fundamental interest protected by the right
of privacy,. . . we do not view this right as a valid prohi-
bition to state interference in the plaintiffs' [the commis-
sioning couple's] contractual arrangement. The statute in
question [Michigan's statute prohibiting paying money to
adopt a baby] does not directly prohibit John Doe and
Mary Roe from having the child as planned. It acts in-
stead to preclude plaintiffs from paying consideration in
conjunction with their use of the state's adoption proce-
dures. In effect, the plaintiffs' contractual agreement dis-
closes a desire to use the adoption code to change the
legal status of the child-i.e., its right to support, intes-
tate succession, etc. We do not perceive this goal as
within the realm of fundamental interests protected by
the right to privacy from reasonable governmental
regulation.""
If the policy against selling existing babies in ordinary adop-
tion is so strong as to survive fourteenth amendment challenge
under the privacy rubric, how much stronger must be the policy
against deliberately producing babies for sale and then selling
them and how much weaker any fourteenth amendment chal-
lenge to such a procedure?
When different constitutional rights belonging to different
persons collide, the courts have to choose which will prevail.
Thus, where a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to a
fair trial collides with the media's first amendment right of free
93. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), leave to appeal denied, 414 Mich.
875 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
94. Id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
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press, the latter almost always prevails over the former. 5 And
where a state university's solicitude for the first amendment's
anti-establishment clause collided with the free-speech clause
claims of religious students under the same amendment, the lat-
ter prevailed29
Assuming arguendo that a constitutional right of infertile
adults to employ a surrogate exists, then that right would collide
with the thirteenth amendment right of the child not to be
bought and sold, and of the adolescent and adult that that child
will become not to be involuntarily bound. Likewise, the surro-
gate's thirteenth amendment right not to be compelled to sur-
render her child (even on the footing that such surrender would
be a personal service rather than a sale) would collide with any
such fourteenth amendment right (assuming there were any) of
infertiles to employ a surrogate. Either way, the strength of the
history and national policy behind the thirteenth amendment
would surely prevail over the alleged right to hire surrogates and
to buy their children.
ENGLISH PRECEDENT
In the past nine years there have been four judicial deci-
sions concerning surrogacy by the English courts. A. v. C.97 and
Derbyshire County Council v. Mrs. P. (First Defendant) and
Mr. B. (Second Defendant)98 arose out of disputes between the
commissioning couple and a surrogate who repudiated the agree-
ment after bearing the child. Re C99 and Re: An Adoption Ap-
95. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (trials); Press Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court [II], 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (preliminary hearings).
96. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
97. A. v. C., [1985] F.L.R. 445 (Fam. & C.A. 1978). Earlier brief notes of the Family
Division decision appeared in 8 Family Law 170 (1978), and of the Court of Appeal deci-
sion in 14 Family Law 241-42 (1984), but the only complete report of thedecisions of
both courts is the one in [1985] Family Law Reports 445-61, which was published nearly
seven years after the courts handed down their decisions in that case. Both Family Law
and Family Law Reports are published in London and Bristol by a private publishing
house. Neither A. v. C. nor any of the later three cases has yet been published in the
Official Reports.
98. Derbyshire County Council v. Mrs. P. (First Defendant) and Mr. B (Second De-
fendant), judgment rendered, at Stafford, by the President of the Family Division (Sir
John Arnold), March 12, 1987 (copy of slip opinion (14 pp.) sent to Professor Means by
Sir John Arnold, April 9, 1987) [hereinafter "Derbyshire County Council").
99. Re C, [1985] F.L.R. 846 (Fam.). This case, decided in the Family Division (by
[Vol. IV
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
plication: Surrogacy00 involved surrogates who were willing to
follow through with their agreements after bearing the child.
Only A. v. C. was appealed and ruled upon by the Court of Ap-
peal, making it the only judicial decision on surrogacy thus far
decided by an appellate court anywhere in the common-law
world.
In both contested surrogacy cases, the courts awarded cus-
tody to the surrogate as mother of the child. In both uncon-
tested cases, the surrogate was allowed to hand over the child
she did not want to the couple that did want it, but only after
the court found the commissioning couple suitable.
In three of the four cases-A. v. C., Re C, and Derbyshire
County Council-the surrogate was inseminated artificially; in
A. v. C., Re C, and Adoption Application-single births ensued;
in Derbyshire County Council twins were born.
In two of the cases the commissioning couple sought and
found the surrogate through a paid agent; in A. v. C. through an
individual (a prostitute); in Re C. through two commercial surro-
gacy agencies, one American, the other English. In Adoption
Application the surrogate sought out the commissioning couple
by placing an ad in a magazine before such ads became illegal.
In Derbyshire County Council also it was the surrogate who ini-
tiated contact with the commissioning couple through an "ac-
quaintance," apparently mutual.
In three of the cases-A. v. C., Re C, and Derbyshire,-the
surrogate was in poorer economic circumstances and of of less
education than the commissioning couple. In Adoption Applica-
tion this disparity, if any, was not great.
It may well be asked why Re C and Adoption Application,
being uncontested cases, were in court at all. In Re C, the "Baby
Cotton Case," the London Borough of Barnet, in which was situ-
ated the maternity hospital in which the surrogate had given
birth and in which the infant still remained, petitioned the Fam-
Latey, J.) in January 1985, was widely publicized in the London press as "the Baby
Cotton Case"-after Kim Cotton, the surrogate who bore the child. This publicity was a
major factor leading to the enactment, six months later, of the Surrogacy Arrangements
Act 1985, ch. 49.
100. Re: An Adoption Application: Surrogacy, judgment rendered in the Family Di-
vision (by Latey, J.), March 11, 1987 (copy of slip opinion (17 pp.) sent to Professor
Means by Sir John Arnold, April 9, 1987) [hereinafter "Adoption Application"].
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ily Division for a place of safety order since the Borough Council
had no information about the American commissioning couple
or their suitability as adopters of this English child.
After noting that the Surrogacy Arrangements Bill was then
before Parliament, Mr. Justice Latey declined to address "the
difficult and delicate problems of ethics, morality, and social de-
sirability" of the "methods used to produce" this child or their
"commercial aspects," holding these matters "not relevant. The
baby is here. All that matters is what is best for her now that
she is here and not how she arrived. . . .Mr. A is the baby's
father and he wants her, as does his wife. The baby's mother
does not want her. . . ."10' Mr. Justice Latey then went on to
examine the suitability of the commissioning couple as potential
parents, and found them "warm, caring, sensible people, as well
as highly intelligent," "both professional people, highly quali-
fied" with "a very nice home in the country and another in
town."'' 0 He therefore awarded custody to the A's. 03
In Adoption Application, the same judge was asked to ap-
prove an application to adopt a child aged two years four
months at the time of the application. In other words, this child
had been conceived early in 1985, before the Surrogacy Arrange-
ments Act became law, but born afterward. Mr. Justice Latey
observed that "the 1985 Act had not been enacted when the ar-
rangement in the instant case was entered into and carried
out;"'1 4 that is, the ad, the agreement, and the (natural) impreg-
nation all preceded the new law.
What the judge had to determine, therefore, was whether
the section of the English Adoption Act'015 prohibiting payment
of money in adoption had been violated by the monetary pay-
ments that had changed hands.'016 That section, generally forbids
such payments, giving the adoption court discretion to approve
them. Mr. Justice Latey held (1) that the payments did not
come within the statutory prohibition but (2) if they did, he had
101. Re C, see supra note 99.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Adoption Application, see supra note 100.
105. Adoption of Children Act 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. V, ch. 29, § 9; Adoption Act 1958; 6
& 7, Eliz. II, ch. 5, § 50; Adoption Act 1976, ch. 36, § 57.
106. Adoption Application, see supra note 100.
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discretion to approve them which he did in this case. 0 '
These uncontested surrogacy cases furnish little guidance
on the questions of public policy that arise in the course of con-
tested cases. However violative of public policy the surrogacy ar-
rangement may have been, if both surrogate and couple go
through with it, they confront the court with a fait accompli:
"The baby is here." So we must turn to the contested surrogacy
cases to find serious discussion of questions of public policy. In
A. v. C.,108 the trial judge stated that
[t]he agreement between the parties I hold as being
against public policy. None of them can rely upon it in
any way or enforce the agreement in any way. I need only
give one of many grounds for saying this, namely that
this was a purported contract for the sale and purchase
of a child. 0
Custody of the child was awarded to the mother but visiting
rights were granted to the father. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peal held that the trial judge had "directed himself . . . in law
perfectly correctly, with one slight exception" which was having
granted visiting rights to the father which the Court unani-
mously terminated."0
The denial of visiting rights to that particular father rested
on facts peculiar to that case. The principle that the surrogacy
arrangement itself violates public policy as a purported contract
for the sale and purchase of a child, however, is general and ap-
plies to all surrogacy arrangements.
The fact that A. v. C. was not fully published until May
1985 meant that both the Warnock Committee and the House of
Commons in its debate on the Surrogacy Arrangements Bill were
unaware of that decision. By the time the Bill was debated in
the House of Lords, however, A. v. C. had been fully published,
and two members discussed it, Lord Meston and the Earl of
107. Id.
108. [1985] F.L.R. 445 (Fain. & C.A. 1978).
109. Id. at 449; compare with Baby M, supra note 70.
110. Id. at 455 (per Ormrod, L.J.). The appellate panel-consisting of Lord Justices
Ormrod (who is a physician), Cumming-Bruce, and Stamp-decided unanimously to ter-
minate the father's visiting rights. In every other respect they affirmed what Mr. Justice
Comyn had decided below, including the question whether a surrogacy arrangement vio-
lates public policy, and why.
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Caithness, the latter reading to the House the passage in Mr.
Justice Comyn's judgment stating that surrogacy agreements
were against public policy."'
Before the Surrogacy Arrangements Bill was debated in the
House of Lords, Dame Mary Warnock, who had chaired the
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryol-
ogy, whose Report to Parliament"' was one of the factors lead-
ing the Government to introduce the Bill, had become a member
of the House, as the Baroness Warnock of Weeke in the City of
Winchester. Her contribution to the debate was significant:
There are now waiting in America a largish number
of agencies wishing, and anxious, to start on this side of
the Atlantic and I think that there is a market for such
agencies. I regard it as a matter of extreme urgency that
to set up such agencies should be made a criminal of-
fence. . . . [P]eople are not prepared to have in this
country agencies which exploit both the misery of the in-
fertile and the willingness of women to act as
surrogates."'
The fact that A. v. C. had not been fully published and
seems to have been unknown to the Warnock Committee in July
1984 when it submitted its Report to Parliament, makes the fol-
lowing passages in that Report all the more significant:
§ 8.5 Any surrogacy arrangement would necessarily
involve some form of agreement between the parties con-
cerned, however informal. Although it may be assumed
that in the majority of cases the agreement would be
kept and the matter never brought before a court, it is
likely that grave difficulties of enforcement would ensue
in the event of a dispute over such an agreement. There
is little doubt that the Courts would treat most, if not all,
surrogacy agreements as contrary to public policy and
therefore unenforceable. Where one party broke the
agreement the other party could not expect to invoke the
111. 164 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1524 (June 14, 1985); 165 PARL. DEn., H.L. 926
(June 28, 1985).
112. Report to Parliament by the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology (Cmnd. 9314) (July 1984) (Chairman: Dame Mary Warnock).
113. 165 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 934 (June 28, 1985).
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court's assistance. Thus, if the carrying mother changed
her mind and decided she wished to keep the child it is
most unlikely that a court would order her, because she
had previously agreed to do so, to hand over the child
against her will. Nor in such a case would a court order
the surrogate mother to repay any fee paid to her under
the terms of the agreement.
§ 8.6 The Courts do, however, have jurisdiction over
children which is quite separate from and independent of
the law of contract. Where a court has to consider the
future of a child born following a surrogacy agreement, it
must do so in accordance with the child's best interests
in all the circumstances of the case, and not according to
the terms of any agreement between the various adults.
The child's interests being the first and paramount con-
sideration, it seems likely that only in very exceptional
circumstances would a court direct a surrogate mother to
hand over the child to the commissioning couple. The
present state of the law makes any surrogacy agreement a
risky undertaking for those involved." 4
In the foregoing passages, § 8.5 is a fair description of what
the English courts had already decided in A. v. C. several years
earlier. Section 8.6 is virtually a prediction of the approach that
would be taken in March 1987 by Sir John Arnold in his judg-
ment at Stafford in the fourth and latest of the English surro-
gacy cases, Derbyshire County Council.
When the Surrogacy Arrangements Bill was debated in the
House of Commons, the following exchange occurred between a
Member (Mr. Beith) and the Minister for Health (Mr. Kenneth
Clarke):
Mr. Beith: Does the Minister accept the view of the
Warnock committee, that it should be put beyond doubt
that surrogacy arrangements cannot be enforced in the
courts, or does he believe that there is no doubt that they
cannot be enforced in the courts? What is the Govern-
ment's view about that?
Mr. Clarke: . . . It is our view, on advice, that such
114. Cmnd. 9314 at 43, §§ 8.5, 8.6 (July 1984).
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contracts are not enforceable now. If anyone went to the
courts in this country seeking to enforce a surrogacy con-
tract-if someone brought an action trying to compel an
unwilling surrogate mother to hand over the child or if
the surrogate mother went to court to try to compel the
would-be parents to pay the fee promised under the con-
tract-it is confidently felt by most people, as the War-
nock committee felt, that such a contract would be re-
garded as unenforceable by the courts and contrary to
public policy. It might be helpful for that point to be put
beyond doubt in statute at some stage, because, although
that is believed to be the position, there is no point in
sitting around waiting for a test case, with all the
problems that would surround such a case for the parties
involved.
1 15
How surprised the Honorable Members would have been to
learn that the test case had already occurred! These expressions
of legal opinion by the Warnock Committee and the government
take on greater significance when it is realized that they were
reached independently of judicial precedent, yet are fully in ac-
cord with the unknown judicial precedent that already existed.
When introducing the Surrogacy Arrangements Bill, the
Secretary of State for Social Services (Mr. Norman Fowler) gave
the same reason for the conclusion that Mr. Justice Comyn had
given in A. v. C.: "Frankly, I believe that it is simply unaccept-
able to sell children, whether before or after birth." 1 6
As enacted, the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 did not
go quite so far as the Warnock Committee had recommended in
legislating against surrogacy, but it did outlaw all commercial
agencies and all advertisements designed to bring together sur-
rogates and commissioning couples." 7
In his March 12, 1987 judgment at Stafford, Sir John Ar-
nold decided the most recent of the four English surrogacy
cases-Derbyshire County Council-the second to resolve a dis-
115. 77 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 54 (April 15, 1985).
116. Id. at 24.
117. For the debates leading to passage of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, see
74 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1188-93; 76 PARL. DEB., H.C. 668; 76 PARL. DEB., H.C. 23-56;
79 PARL. DEB., H.C. 115-33 (1985); 160 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1474-76; 163 PARL. DEB.,
H.L. 1023; 164 PARL. DEB., H.L. 1518-38; 165 PARL. DEB., H.L. (1985).
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pute between a commissioning couple and a repudiating surro-
gate. Though bound, of course, by the Court of Appeal's judg-
ment in A. v. C., Sir John reached the same result by a different
route without even mentioning that precedent:
There was, as I have indicated, an agreement be-
tween the mother and Mr. B., not, I think, at all an
agreement of which one of the terms was that care and
control in a Wardship [i.e., custody] context should be
given to Mr. B., the agreement foresaw an adoption by
Mr. B. and Mrs. B., but whatever the exact nature of the
agreement was, the Wardship jurisdiction is not one
which is, or is ever, regulated by contract. It is a jurisdic-
tion in which, as I have already indicated, the court's
duty is to decide the case, taking into account as the first
and paramount consideration, the welfare of the child or
children concerned and if that consideration leads the
court to override any agreement that there may be in the
matter, then that the court is fully entitled to do. It is,
therefore, not of great importance in this case to rule
upon the validity, or otherwise, of the agreement which
was made.'
18
In reaching the conclusion that the twins' best interests
were served by leaving them with their mother, Sir John Arnold
overrode the agreement. Nowhere in the judgment is there any
reference to possible visiting rights for the father. The father
had voluntarily disclaimed any such rights, reasoning that if the
twins were to be reared by their mother, it would be less confus-
ing if he were simply to fade out of the picture." 9 A similar atti-
tude, it is understood, was manifested by William Stern in the
Baby "M" case, 120 before the judgment in the court below. In A.
v. C., on the other hand, the father fought for visiting rights all
the way to the Court of Appeal which denied him them. Some
fathers, evidently, are more persistent than others.
118. Derbyshire County Council, Slip op. at 7-8.
119. Telephone conversation with Sir John Arnold, President of the Family Division
(High Court of Justice), England, May 28, 1987.
120. In re Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), cert.




Surrogacy contracts are void under the thirteenth amend-
ment and the federal Anti-Peonage Act; offend public policy; do
not fit within the tacit exception allowed for adoption; and are
not protected by the fourteenth amendment.
In respect of custody, the state law applicable to custody
contests between the natural parents of nonmarital children
generally should be declared applicable to children produced
through surrogacy arrangements. With the contract removed
from the issue, this is an appropriate way to determine custody.
English precedent should be adopted to declare the surrogacy
contract to be a "purported contract for the sale and purchase of
a child" and therefore unenforceable "in any way." If, however,
the agreement is characterized as one for personal services only,
then it should be declared incapable of specific performance
pursuant to the thirteenth amendment and the Anti-Peonage
Act. Moreover, any other manner of enforcement of a surrogacy
contract should be barred by public policy.
English precedent should be followed not because it is En-
glish, nor even because it is precedent, but because, in this mat-
ter, it embodies the essence of our own achievement in the
universalization of human liberty. As Mr. Justice Marshall has
recently reminded us, our original Constitution, whose bicente-
nary we celebrate this year, did not prohibit slavery or involun-
tary servitude. It would take a bloody Civil War and a thirteenth
amendment to achieve that goal. But America's aspiration to-
ward that goal was there from the beginning. The very same
Summer of 1787 when the Federal Convention in Philadelphia
was writing the fugitive slave clause and the clause preserving
the slave trade for twenty years into our original Constitution,
another equally representative body of Americans, the Continen-
tal Congress, in New York City, enacted the Northwest Ordi-
nance, the first national prohibition of slavery anywhere within
the United States. As we have seen, determined opponents tried
to undo the effect of Article VI, and they succeeded partially
and for a time, but in the end, it was Article VI, and not their
efforts, that furnished the text of the thirteenth amendment.' 2 '
121. It may be a matter of more than parochial interest that these lines were written
on July 13, 1987, the two hundredth anniversary of the passage of the Northwest Ordi-
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The argument is frequently made that we are in great need
of legislation on surrogacy-either to prohibit or to regulate it.
What is usually ignored is the fact that it is already outlawed by
the thirteenth amendment and the Anti-Peonage Act. There is
room, however, for legislation making it a crime to practice or
promote surrogacy arrangements. Like other constitutional
texts, the thirteenth amendment does not embody criminal
sanctions. Such legislation would be within the power of Con-
gress under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment. State legisla-
tion with the same aim would also, presumably, be valid since it
would not contradict or frustrate the federal purpose.
Today, the advocates of surrogacy are attempting to re-
create, in a different age and context, the slave trade, indentured
bondage, and peonage. They must be stopped. We are fortunate,
in this generation, that our ancestors have bequeathed us the
means to stop them. Unlike the abolitionists of yore, we have a
Constitution, as amended, that universalizes freedom. Our
courts have ready to hand the perfect weapon with which to slay
the reborn monster-the thirteenth amendment. May they use
it well!
nance, at New York Law School, which is only three-quarters of a mile from the site
where the Continental Congress enacted it.
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